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This study develops an analytical framework to examine the impact of generic 
advertising on brand advertising with alternative assumptions on demand changes (shift-
up and rotation), product differentiation, market concentration, and relationship between 
commodity and brand advertising programs. The newly developed model allows one to 
determine the relationship between generic and brand advertising, which has not been 
clearly shown in previous studies. Analytical results show that when generic advertising 
leads to an inelastic demand, generic advertising would help brand advertising and could 
decrease the optimal brand advertising expenditures. However, when generic advertising 
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 Generic Advertising in Concentrated and Differentiated Agricultural Markets 
As agricultural producers are increasingly integrated and become larger, these large 
production units tend to produce differentiated and identity-preserved products that focus 
on certain product attributes and consumer demands.    Currently, almost $1billion is 
spent annually to promote agricultural commodities and major commodity groups (e.g., 
dairy, beef, and pork) invest majority shares of their checkoff budgets in generic 
advertising.    Many studies in the agricultural economics literature indicate that the 
generic advertising has successfully increased the industry demand for most commodity 
groups.    One of important assumptions of generic advertising is that each industry 
produces a homogeneous product.    Therefore the purpose of generic advertising is to 
increase the industry demand while expecting equal benefit to each producer.    However, 
in recent years, as agricultural and food industries are more concentrated and vertically 
integrated, products of these industries become more differentiated, which leads to 
various agricultural product brands and separate brand advertising programs.    Brand 
advertising intends to increase market share of its own brand by persuading consumers to 
prefer its own brand to other brands.    Through various brand advertising programs, 
producers try to differentiate their products emphasizing their unique quality attributes.   
Obviously, this is not consistent with the objective of generic  advertising.  Therefore, 
opponents of generic advertising claim that since generic advertising sends a signal that 
all products are homogeneous, it weakens brand messages by producers of differentiated 
products.    These arguments are extremely important for many commodity checkoff 
programs and could be a direct challenge to the future of these programs. 
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 The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of generic advertising 
and the relationship between commodity and brand advertising under the differentiated 
product environments.    We develop an analytical model that considers product 
differentiation, market concentration, and relationship between commodity and brand 
advertising  programs.  Then  the  analysis  is devoted to examine welfare distribution of 
generic advertising among producers who produce different quality level of products.   
Analytical results are expected to vary by types of demand shifts, market concentration, 
degree of product differentiation, and product relationship (i.e., substitutes, complements, 
and independent). 
 
Review of Previous Studies 
There have been several studies investigating the relationship between generic and brand 
advertising under product differentiation.    The papers mostly focus on theoretical 
development of the effectiveness of advertising programs at firm and industry levels.   
Crespi and Marette (2002) investigate the effects of generic advertising on the product 
differentiation among competing brands. Crespi and Marette’s framework follows Mussa 
and Rosen (1978) to develop an analytical model under the assumption of vertical 
product differentiation. The analytical derivation examines how the effectiveness and the 
optimal level of brand advertising are affected by generic advertising when market 
demands are derived from consumer utilities with differentiated product qualities. Results 
of the study show that generic advertising may benefit the low quality producers more 
than the high quality producers. The findings bring an important implication to 
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 agricultural and food industries where products are becoming more differentiated. 
Hunnicutt and Israelsen (2003) examine the brand advertising effects from 
individual producers which are voluntarily funding under differentiated product industry. 
Considering the monopolistically competitive industry, they develop a conceptual model 
for generic and brand advertising, which includes the market share and degree of product 
differentiation. Advertising benefits are clearly examined by showing the market 
expansion effects and branding effects through comparative statistic analyses. 
Chakravarti & Janiszewski (2004) examine effects of the generic advertising on the brand 
preferences through experiments under various scenarios. Results of the experiments 
suggest that the generic advertising may affect consumers’ choice of brand through 
increasing or decreasing their perceived brand differentiation. They also found that 
contrary to the objective of generic advertising, the generic advertising may increase the 
brand differentiation. Bass et al. (2005) analyze effects of generic and brand advertising 
in a duopoly market using an optimal control model. In this study, each firm can make 
decision its price, and generic and brand advertising levels. The study shows that a 
stronger firm is more likely to invest in generic advertising, and the market share mainly 
depends on the brand advertising. Crespi (2007) and Isariyawongse et al. (2007) extend 
the Crespi and Marette (2002)’s framework to vertical differentiation and horizontal 
product differentiation in duopoly market, respectively.   
Although these previous studies provide useful framework for understanding the 
relationship between generic and brand advertising programs, the relationship has not 
been clearly identified.    Most analytical results from these studies were not able to sign 
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 the marginal effects of optimal brand advertising and its effectiveness with respect to 
generic advertising.    In addition, the empirical analysis has been rarely conducted.   
 
Model 
A Cournot competition model with generic advertising and brand advertising is 
developed in this study.  Similar to Quirmbach (1988) and Hamilton (1999), the model 
considers generic advertising and brand advertising parameters as demand shifters. 
Unlike the previous studies (e.g. Crespi and Marrett 2002; Crespi 2007; Isariyawongse, 
Kudo, and Tremblay 2007), the model developed in this study considers demand shifts 
and rotations with elasticities of demand and advertising, market concentration, degree of 
product differentiation, and product relationship (i.e., substitutes, complements, and 
independent). Applying elasticities and alternative patterns of demand shift to the model 
is expected to provide clearer results of generic advertising impact on brand advertising 
than previous studies.   
Consider a Cournot oligopoly market where exists a fixed number, n, of 
producing firms, and entry is not concerned. We assume some firms, k (k < n), in this 
market produce a branded and nonbranded product and may attempt to create subjective 
product differentiation through brand advertising. The products are substantially 
undifferentiated, but the brand products are advertised. Other firms, n-k, produce only 
nonbranded products (Tremblay and Polasky 2002: Zhang, Sexton, and Alston 2002). The 
firms producing nonbranded products face the same market demands, and compete in 
quantity in the homogeneous market. The firms producing brand products that share the 
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 brand product’s market engage in competition to expand its market share. We assume the 
total brand advertising may increase market demand.   
The output of a representative firm i is denoted by qi and the market output, Q, is 
represented as:  . A marketing board of commodity controls the level of generic 
advertising expenditures funded by checkoff assessment. The mandatory checkoffs are 
levied to participants in the programs by a unit assessment rate, t. When the marketing 
board allocates the entire checkoff fee to the spending of generic advertising, the feasible 
generic advertising expenditures, G, is represented as: G=tQ. In the market exist brands, 
BN, less than or equal to the number of firms (products), i.e., BN≤n. Some producers 
invest their brand advertising for consumers to convince the qualities and attributes of the 
goods for subjective differentiation. The brand advertising expenditure for firm i is 
denoted as Bi , which is a function of the expenditures of generic advertising, i.e., Bi (t). 
In previous studies, the effectiveness of generic advertising was estimated by measuring 
the expansion of total market demand, and therefore in this case the market demand curve 
would shift up rightward. In this study, however, we consider clockwise and 
counterclockwise rotations of market demand curve as well as shift-up. The main 
concerns are the effectiveness of generic advertising on brand advertising effectiveness; 
when generic advertising affects the total demand to change in shifting upward or rotating 
(counter) clockwise, what is direction of changing the brand advertising effectiveness in? 
Is it same or opposite direction, or none with the direction of the effectiveness of generic 
advertising? 
∑ =
i i q Q
The market demand is given by the inverse demand function P=P(Q, t, B(t)). We 
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 assume that the inverse demand is twice continuously differentiable, and let the subscripts 
indicate partial differentiation, PQ<0 for all Q. That is, the slope of the market demand is 
downward regardless of the effects of demand shifters. The demand curve is concave in 
generic advertising assessment rates and brand advertising expenditures, that is, Pt>0, 
PB>0, and Ptt<0, PBB<0.  
Based on these assumptions, we consider three scenarios. The scenarios start with 
advertising which leads parallel shifts demand, then considers elastic and inelastic 
rotation of the demand curve. The three scenarios related to shift and rotation of demand 
curves include:   
i)  PQt   = 0 indicating parallel shift. 
ii)  PQt< 0, PQB < 0 indicating inelastic rotation (clockwise rotation). 
iii)  PQt>0, PQB >0 indicating elastic rotation (counterclockwise rotation). 
PQt ≡∂PQ/∂t denotes the change in the slope of demand curve (PQ ) with respect to the 
generic advertising assessment rate (t). The first scenario, therefore, Pt > 0 and PQt   = 0 is 
a parallel increase in demand, which is a demand shift typically applied in the advertising 
literatures. However, a case may occur when the brand advertising does not affect 
demand shift, but changes the slope of it. The second scenario, in addition to the concave 
conditions, PQt or PQB < 0, means that both generic and brand advertising decrease the 
variation of consumers’ valuation and make the demand curve steeper, consequently the 
more advertising, the more elastic demand. The third scenario is the opposite case of the 
second one. When generic and brand advertising lead consumers to be more sensitive to 
price change and increase the variation of consumers’ valuations, demand curve becomes 
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 more flat and elastic.     
The firm i's cost function is given by  )) ( , ( t B q C C i i i = . We assume that while the 
marginal cost of production ( ) is constant for any output level qi, the marginal cost of 
brand advertising is increasing ( ) at a decreasing rate ( ). Each firm has an 
equivalent marginal cost of production and brand advertising expenditures.   
i q c
c 0 >
i B 0 <
i iB B c
Then, the firm i's profit function may be written as:     
[] )) ( , ( )) ( , , ( t B q C q t t B t Q P i i i i i i − − = π . 
Differentiating  i π  with  respect  to  qi yields the first-order condition as: 
(1)   .  0 )) ( , , ( = − + − =
i i q Q i i q c P q t t B t Q P π
Then, the second order condition of firm i would be:   
(2)   .  0 )) ( , , ( 2 < − + =
i i i i q q QQ i i Q q q c P q t B t Q P π
Rewritting equation (1) using firm i's market share leads to:   
(3)   0 )) ( , , ( = − + − =
i i q Q i i q c QP s t t B t Q P π , 
where  represents market share of firm i.   Q q s i i / =
Following Dixit (1986) , Seade (1980), and Vives (1999), conditions for existence 
and stability of oligopoly equilibrium are: 
(4)   0 1 > − Q q q P c
i i ,  
(5)   , and    0 < + QQ i Q P q P
(6)   0 ) 1 ( < − + =
−i i i i q q i q q s π π λ , 
where the second term of the right hand side of equation (6) is the summation of the 
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 output response of all other firms except firm i. Equation (6) is a necessary condition for 
a maximum, and requires (Hamilton 1999b; Seade 1980). 
To address the optimal brand advertising expenditure at the firm level, its 
expenditure Bi
* is treated as a continuous variable following Seade (1980), Besley(1989), 
and Hamilton (1999) . After the checkoff fee is set to maximize the industrial total profit 
by the marketing board, a representative firm’s optimal brand advertising, B
*
i(t), is 
derived from the following indirect profit function: 
(7)   [ ] 0 )) ( , ( )) ( , , (
* * * * * * * * ≥ − − = t B q C q t t B t Q P i i i i i i π , 
where the superscript (*) denotes optimal levels of checkoff assessment rates and output 
levels at firm and market. 
 
To find the effects of generic advertising on firm-level output and the optimal 
brand advertising expenditure, total differentiation is conducted on FOC of equations (3)   
And (7). Combining these equations yields:   




































* * π π
π λ
where  and  t B t T i P P P + = t QB Qt QT i P P P + = . Suppose the coefficient matrix in equation (8) 
is denoted as Φ. Then the determinant of the matrix Φ is:   
(9)   ( )( ) ( )( )
i i i B QQ i Q i B B i QQ i Q c QP s P s c P q QP s P Det + − − − + = Φ 1 2 ) ( .  
Rewriting equation (9) with elasticity terms gives:   
(9)’   ( )( ) ( )( ) [ ] B i i B B i i Q c E s s c P q E s P Det − − − − − = Φ 1 1 2 ) ( , 
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 where  Q QQ P P Q E − ≡  denotes the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand. A 
direction of E implies curvature of the demand curve: E>0, E<0, and E=0 implies convex, 
concave, and linear, respectively (Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser 2010). Implying the two 
stability conditions, two terms in the bracket,  ( ) E si − 2  and( ) E si − 1 , are positive. The 
first term,  , measures firm i's response to rival’s output (Hamilton 1999b; 
Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser 2010). Collecting terms and rewriting equation (9)’ yields:   
( E si − 2 )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] { } E s s E s c P q E s P Det i i i B B i i Q i i − − + − − − = Φ 1 1 2 2 ) (
. 
The first part of the brace in braces measures the slope of firm i’s marginal revenue 
changed by its own brand advertising (denoted by  ), and the second part of the 
brace denotes the summation of the slope changes of the marginal revenue due to 
increasing marginal costs of brand advertising in the entire market (denoted by  ). 









QR P MR MR P Det
B B ) ( Q
where  Ω        
          
  . Three cases exist in determining the sign of the 
determinant, which shows the relative impacts of slope changes of marginal revenue to 
individual f t: 
,   
irm and entire marke
 i) Ω 0 ,  ii) Ω 0 , and iii)  Ω 0  . 





We consider first the effect of generic advertising on the individual firm’s output. 
Since the unit checkoff assessment rate has a similar nature to the production checkoff, 
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 the firm-level output is expected to decrease with the assessment rate. The impact of 
generic advertising on the individual firm’s output, therefore, is generally expected to be 
negative:  0 <
dt
dqi . From equation (8), the impact of change of generic advertising 
(represented by the checkoff assessment rate) on the output of a representative firm is 
derived:   
(10)   ( )
() () ( ) () B QQ i Q i B B i QQ i Q
QB i i Qt i t B i
c QP s P s c P q QP s P
QP s q QP s P c
dt
dq






and is rewritten with elasticity terms as:   
(10)’   ( )
() ( ) ( ) () [] B i i B B i i Q
B i i B t t i B t i
c E s s c P q E s P
Ψ s q P P Ψ s c P
dt
dq



















Q Ψ =  , which represent the output elasticities of generic 
advertising assessment rates and brand advertising expenditures, respectively (Hamilton 
1999; Cowan 2004).   
  To determine sign of (10)’, we should consider the three cases of demand 
changes influenced by generic advertising, which are shift up, elastic, or inelastic rotation 
of the demand curve. Each of the cases is also dependent on the influences of brand 
advertising effects, which are no change slope, elastic, or inelastic rotation of the demand 
curve. Table 1 shows the results of signs of        ⁄  for each case of demand changes. 
Generally, when generic advertising attempts to expand total market demand (PQt = 0 
shift up) and leads to elastic demand (PQt > 0 rotates counterclockwise), most of the signs 
denote positive except that the case of brand advertising leads to elastic demand. 
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 According to the results, when brand advertising makes the demand inelastic or does not 
change the slope of the demand curve, most of the cases are positive or conditionally 
positive except the case when generic advertising makes the demand inelastic, that is, 
rotates the demand curve clockwise.   
In the opposite case, when brand advertising leads elastic demand, most of the 
cases are negative or ambiguous. While generic advertising leads to increase market 
demand (PQt = 0) and rotate clockwise (PQt < 0, inelastic demand), if brand advertising 
makes demand elastic, then the signs show negative or ambiguous. In the case of generic 
advertising generating the market demand curve to rotate clockwise (inelastic demand), 
most of the effectiveness show negative or ambiguous except when Pt>1 and brand 
advertising make elastic demand or do not change the slope of the demand curve, the 
impacts of generic advertising on firm-level output are conditionally positive.   
Opponents of generic advertising argue that it may lessen consumers’ subjective 
perceptions about the brand’s differentiated attributes that have been increased by brand 
advertising (Glickman 1997).  If a firm spends more money for brand advertising to 
recover a brand’s reputation that was impacted by generic advertising, the sign of (11)’ 





The impact of generic advertising (represented by the checkoff assessment rate) 
on the optimal brand advertising expenditures of a representative firm is derived:   
(11)   () ( ) ( )( ) ( )
() () ( ) () B QQ i Q i B B i QQ i Q
Bt i T QQ i Q QQ i Q i Bt i
c QP s P s c P q QP s P
c q P QP s P QP s P s c
dt
dB
+ − − − +
− − + − + −
=
1 2
1 2 1 *
, 
and rewriting with the elasticity terms yields: 
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 (11)’   () ( ) ( ) [] ( )( )
() ( ) ( ) () B i i B B i i
i T i i i i Bt i
c E s s c P q E s
q P E s E s E s s c
dt
dB
− − − − −
− − − − + − −
=
1 1 2
1 2 2 1 1
*
.  
  The sign of equation (11)’ is determined by the direction of the numerator. At 
first, we determine directions of the second part of the numerator. Since the sign of the 
first term, (2-siE) is already known as positive, the unkown sign of the second part is the 
second term, (PT -1). Therefore, the sign depends on whether PT =1, PT >1, or PT <0. 
Since PT is the summation of Pt and PBt, the results are dependent on the sign of PBt. We 
assume PT  and Pt ,which has scenarios with the values of it, are always positive , and 
then we can determine the sign of PBt with respect to the scenarios of Pt . Table 2 shows 
the signs of all terms for each scenario. Depending on the sign of cBt , the second 
differentiation of marginal cost of brand advertising with respect to the generic 
advertising, the sign of all cases are reported in table 3.   
When the total effect of generic advertising on the inverse demand (market price) 
is greater than or equal to one, PT  ≥1, and the effect of generic advertising on the 
marginal brand advertising cost is negative or equal to zero, cBt ≤0, the signs of these 
cases are positive except that there may be no impact when PT =1 and cBt =0. This result 
means that the firm would spend more brand advertising expenditures as generic 
advertising increases. Since the effect of generic advertising on the marginal brand 
advertising cost is less than zero in these cases, the marginal brand advertising 
expenditures increase with diminishing rate with respect to the checkoff fee. In other 
cases when the generic advertising assessment rate causes an increase, the marginal cost 
of brand advertising with increasing rate or at least no impact on it, cBt ≥0, and when the 
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 total effectiveness of generic advertising on market price is less than or equal to one (PT 
≤1), the signs of these cases are negative. In this case, generic advertising may lead to 
decrease of brand advertising expenditures. 
 
Summary of Analytical Results 
An analytical model developed in this study examines impacts of generic advertising on 
brand advertising. To explain the relationship, we applied the theory of demand changes; 
shift-up, clockwise, and counterclockwise rotation. Through comparative statistics using 
elasticities of demand and advertising, we were able to sign three equations: the effect of 
generic advertising on an individual’s product 
dt
dqi   and the impact of generic 
advertising on brand advertising expenditures 
dt
dBi . 
  When generic advertising expands the total market demand (shift-up) and makes 
demand inelastic (clockwise rotation) and brand advertising also induces inelastic 
demand, generic advertising positively affects an individual firm’s output and the 
marginal profit effectiveness of brand advertising. When generic advertising influences 
brand advertising to make less elastic demand, the individual firm can reduce brand 
advertising expenditures. Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004) provide useful experiment 
results to support our findings. According to their experiment, generic advertising shows 
a differentiating (nondifferentiating) attribute decreases access to information about the 
nondifferentiating (differentiating) attribute, which results in an increase in the 
importance of the differentiating (nondifferentiating) attribute and decreased price 
15 
 response. In that case, generic advertising potentially redistributes market shares among 
brands. This implies that in case that generic advertising gives some messages about 
subjective differentiating attributes which are for examples taste, colors, figures, rather 
than objective information, generic advertising may help to change consumer’s 
preferences to branded product. Connecting to the analytical results of this study, when 
generic advertising may induce market demand inelastic (rotate clockwise), it would help 
to brand advertising.   
  Zhang and Sexton (2002), however, suggest that if advertising makes retail 
demand less elastic, generic advertising will exacerbate the oligopoly distortion in the 
market and will lead to an outcome harmful to producers that causes reduced farm sales. 
 
Directions for Further Research 
The analytical framework developed so far should be extended to product differentiation 
and  concentration.  The  empirical  verification of the relationship between generic and 
brand advertising should also be conducted.    A complete version of this study will be 
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Table 1. Impact of Generic Advertising on Firm-level Output,  t d dqi   
  0 = QB P   0 > QB P   0 < QB P  
Case 1: Generic advertising does not change the slope of demand curve, PQt = 0 
1 = t P  
1 > t P  










Case 2: Generic advertising rotates counterclockwise the demand curve (elastic 
demands), PQt > 0 
1 = t P  
1 > t P  
1 < t P  
+ 
+ 
+ if > t iΨ s 1 − t P  
? 
? 
- if ≤ t iΨ s 1 − t P  
+ 
+ 
+ if ≥ t iΨ s 1 − t P  
Case 3: Generic advertising rotates clockwise the demand curve (inelastic demands), 
PQt < 0 
1 = t P  
1 > t P  
1 < t P  
- 
+ if > t iΨ s 1 − t P  
- 
- 
- if ≥ t iΨ s 1 − t P  
- 
? 






Table 2. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Optimal Brand Advertising Expenditures 
(Scenarios) 
20 
T   1 = P   1 > T P   1 < T P  
1 = t P  
1 > t P  
1 < t P  
Bt P =0 
Bt P <0 
Bt P >0 
Bt P >0 
Bt P ≥0 
Bt P >0 
Bt P <0 
Bt P <0 






Table 3. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Optimal Brand Advertising Expenditures; 
t d dBi  
  1 = T P   1 > T P   1 < T P  
0 = Bt c  
0 > Bt c  
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